频繁并购重组与异常审计收费

以2012—2017年A股上市公司为样本，采用异常审计费用衡量审计师对上市公司频繁并购重组的风险溢价，探究企业频繁并购重组与审计师风险溢价收费的关系，研究发现企业频繁并购重组会导致审计师风险溢价提高。从商誉和盈余管理角度探究其路径机制发现，商誉和真实盈余管理是频繁并购重组导致更高审计师风险溢价两个重要中介变量，而应计盈余管理并没有发挥中介作用，即频繁并购重组企业操纵利润的手段倾向于采用真实盈余管理，而非应计盈余管理。     

内部控制、僵尸企业与审计特征

以2010—2017年深沪两市全部A股上市公司为研究样本，分析僵尸企业的审计特征并探讨内部控制对两者关系的调节效应。研究发现：相比于非僵尸企业，僵尸企业具有倾向于支付更低的审计费用、更有可能收到非标意见和更有可能选择非高质量审计师进行审计的特征，同时，僵尸企业内部控制环境更差。进一步研究发现，更高的内部控制质量使得僵尸企业更有可能收到标准无保留的审计意见，但非僵尸企业审计收费更高且更有可能选择高质量审计师。基于产权性质的进一步研究发现：（1）国有僵尸企业支付更低的审计费用，且中央国企支付的审计费用更低；（2）民营僵尸企业更有可能收到非标审计意见；（3）民营僵尸企业和地方国有僵尸企业更有可能选择非高质量审计师进行审计，且地方国有僵尸企业倾向性更强。从公司治理角度研究僵尸企业的审计特征，为识别僵尸企业提供了经验证据。     

政府审计、内部控制与企业创新

利用手工收集的政府审计公告数据，以2013—2017年的国有上市公司为样本，采用PSM+DID方法检验政府审计对国有上市公司创新活动的影响，并进一步根据内部控制质量和是否存在内部控制缺陷对样本进行分组检验两者之间的关系。研究结果表明：政府审计显著增加了国有上市公司的创新投入和创新产出；在内部控制质量高和不存在内部控制缺陷的样本企业中，政府审计对企业创新活动的促进作用更加显著。     

Insurance activity,real output,and geopolitical risk: Fresh evidence from BRICS

This paper fills some empirical gaps by evaluating the causal associations among insurance premiums, real output, and geopolitical risk in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) from 1985 to 2017. We utilize a newly-developed Granger-causality quantile analysis to assess the causal relationships among the series under consideration in each distribution quantile. Our empirical results reveal unidirectional causality that runs from real output and geopolitical risk to insurance activities in Brazil and South Africa. We also observe bi-directional lower-tail causality among real output, insurance premiums, and geopolitical risk in Russia. Findings also present bi-directional causality among real output, insurance premiums, and geopolitical risk at different quantiles. Knowledge of these causal relationships can prevent governments from conducting a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy.     

Dynamic Tax Evasion with Habit Formation in Consumption*

We model the optimal intertemporal decision of an agent who chooses tax evasion and consumption, over an infinite lifetime horizon, where consumption is driven by habits. We find the following: (i) tax evaders reduce consumption in the early stages of habit accumulation and increase it over time; (ii) habit formation has a dampening effect on tax evasion; (iii) neglecting tax evasion can lead to habit overestimation; (iv) the effect of the tax rate on tax evasion is ambiguous; (v) heavy fines are more efficient than frequent controls in reducing tax evasion.     

Public Attention and Auditor Behavior: The Case of Hurun Rich List in China

Adverse client publicity can entail regulatory scrutiny over audited financial statements and impose political costs on auditors. We use the changes in client publicity caused by their controlling owners’ presence on the Hurun Rich List (the rich listing) in China to test the hypothesis that auditor conservatism increases with client publicity. Our evidence indicates auditors issue more adverse audit opinions to clients and charge higher fees following the rich listing events. Moreover, we observe that auditors strategically respond to clients with different attributes—for clients whose owners accumulated wealth in a more questionable manner, auditors choose more stringent audit reporting to better defend themselves from regulatory scrutiny; for clients without such attributes, auditors primarily rely on increasing audit fees to cope with any post-listing increase in audit risks. Our analyses also suggest the impacts of rich listings tend to be concentrated among large audit firms with stronger reputation concerns or among engagement auditors with more conservative reporting styles. By showing how auditors manage political risks associated with heightened public scrutiny, we contribute to both the auditing and political cost literature.     

Does the severity of a client’s negative environmental,social and governance reputation affect audit effort and audit quality?

In recent years, investors have begun to value companies’ reputations through their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices. ESG risk can affect business processes and controls and can heighten financial risk and threaten a firm’s survival. This study examines whether and how the severity of media coverage of a firm’s negative ESG issues (tainted ESG reputation) is associated with audit effort and audit quality. I find that auditors manage the higher expected engagement risk conveyed by tainted ESG reputation by applying higher audit effort. Next, I observe that the increased effort is associated with auditors likely detecting and requiring adjustments for material misstatements and that tainted ESG reputation is associated with fewer misstatements (i.e., reduces poor audit quality). The association between tainted ESG reputation and audit quality is driven primarily by increased audit report lag, not by increased audit fees. Further, I find that tainted ESG reputation is positively associated with audit effort and reduces poor audit quality for up to three years. The results also show that the audit effort and audit quality effect vary across the three components of ESG.     

Joint audits and mutual ties of audit firm networks

There has been a lively debate following the 2007 financial crisis regarding the role of joint audits. Prior research argues that joint audits may improve audit quality because of shared audit efforts. However, empirical evidence has been inconclusive. To gain insight into how Big 4 audit firm imprimaturs have become a source of legitimacy in the audit industry, this article investigates how audit networks drive the audit industry in Saudi Arabia. Based on the application of quantitative and qualitative research methods, we conclude that the Big 4 audit firms have strong mutual ties, but ties with other local and international audit firms are weak. We also find the oligopolistic nature of the Big 4 audit firms and international audit firms. Specifically, Ernst & Young, KPMG, PwC, and PKF are controlling over 68% of the audit market. Interviews with accounting professionals suggest that several benefits of joint audits exist, but certain additional costs are also implicated. Our findings are particularly relevant for regulators and local and international policymakers in rethinking and evaluating the appropriateness of either the mandatory or voluntary nature of joint audits in developing countries.     

高管机会主义品行与公司信息披露决策

文章构建相应策略识别了高管机会主义品行，并探究其对公司信息披露决策的影响。研究结果表明，高管的机会主义品行会显著增加公司信息披露违规、真实盈余管理行为；提升公司选择非国际“四大”会计师事务所的概率，并支付更高的审计费用。随着高管机会主义水平上升，公司更有可能作出上述决策。进一步地，国有产权能在一定程度上抑制高管机会主义品行对信息披露质量的负面影响，却显著增加了公司应计盈余管理；当高管机会主义水平较高时，国有产权也无法发挥有效治理作用。从经济后果看，高管的机会主义品行能被资本市场识别，并显著减损公司未来价值。     

Debt Covenant Restriction,Financial Misreporting,and Auditor Monitoring*

Theory suggests that financial report-based debt covenants engender incentives for the manager to relax covenant constraints through accounting choices in order to avoid costly covenant violations. Prior studies directly testing this hypothesis in the context of financial misreporting fail to find consistent evidence. Using a more refined measure of debt covenant restriction, we find that debt covenant restriction is positively associated with the probability of financial statement misstatements. This positive association is driven by performance covenants rather than capital covenants and is more consistent with the manager striving to avoid a “false-positive” violation than to delay the violation. Our results also imply that managers resort to both income-increasing and non–income-increasing misreporting to relieve covenant constraints and rely more on the latter when faced with greater earnings management constraints. Additionally, the auditor charges higher audit fees to firms with more binding covenants even outside the violation state, and audit fees increase with constraints relative to both performance and capital covenants, reflecting greater financial reporting risk and bankruptcy risk, respectively. Within capital covenants, we find some evidence of even higher audit fees for tighter intangible-inclusive versus intangible-exclusive capital covenants. Lastly, our evidence suggests that the positive association between covenant constraints and misreporting is attenuated when the auditor has more experience with debt covenants, has greater bargaining power over the client, or faces greater litigation risk.